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Abstract
Bayesian hypothesis testing is re-examined from the perspective of an a priori assess-
ment of the test statistic distribution under the alternative. By assessing the distri-
bution of an observable test statistic, rather than prior parameter values, we provide
a practical default Bayes factor which is straightforward to interpret. To illustrate
our methodology, we provide examples where evidence for a Bayesian strikingly
supports the null, but leads to rejection under a classical test. Finally, we conclude
with directions for future research.
Keywords: Bayesian, Hypothesis testing, Bayes factor, p-value, Test statistic, Multi-
ple comparisons.
1 Introduction
Bayesians and Classicists are sharply divided on the question of hypothesis testing. Hy-
pothesis testing is a cousin to model selection and in a world of high dimensional selec-
tion problems, hypothesis testing is as relevant today as it ever has been. We contrast
∗Hedibert Lopes is Professor of Statistics and Econometrics at Insper Institute of Education and Re-
search (hedibertfl@insper.edu.br) and Nicholas Polson is Professor of Econometrics and Statistics at
University of Chicago Booth School of Business (ngp@chicagobooth.edu).
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these two approaches, by re-examining the construction of a hypothesis test, motivated
by the seminal paper of Edwards, Lindman and Savage (1996) (hereafter ELS) who pro-
vide the following contrast:
We now show informally, as much as possible from a classical point of view, how
evidence that leads to classical rejection of a null hypothesis at the 0.05 level can
favor that null hypothesis. The loose and intuitive argument can easily be made
precise. Consider a two-tailed t test with many degrees of freedom. If a true null
hypothesis is being tested, t will exceed 1.96 with probability 2.5% and will exceed
2.58 with probability 0.5%. (Of course, 1.96 and 2.58 are the 5% and 1% two-tailed
significance levels; the other 2.5% and 0.5% refer to the possibility that t may be
smaller than -1.96 or -2.58.) So on 2% of all occasions when true null hypotheses
are being tested, t will lie between 1.96 and 2.58. How often will t lie in that interval
when the null hypothesis is false? That depends on what alternatives to the null
hypothesis are to be considered. Frequently, given that the null hypothesis is false,
all values of t between, say, −20 and +20 are about equally likely for you. Thus,
when the null hypothesis is false, t may well fall in the range from 1.96 to 2.58
with at most the probability (2.58 - 1.96)/ [+20 - (-20)] = 1.55%. In such a case,
since 1.55 is less than 2 the occurrence of t in that interval speaks mildly for, not
vigorously against, the truth of the null hypothesis. This argument, like almost all
the following discussion of null hypothesis testing, hinges on assumptions about the
prior distribution under the alternative hypothesis. The classical statistician usually
neglects that distribution in fact, denies its existence. He considers how unlikely a t
as far from 0 as 1.96 is if the null hypothesis is true, but he does not consider that a
t as close to 0 as 1.96 may be even less likely if the null hypothesis is false.
In terms of a decision rule1, ELS go on to say:
If you need not make your guess until after you have examined a datum D, you
will prefer to guess A if and only if Ω(A|D) exceeds J/I, that is L(A; D) >
J/IΩ(A) = Λ where your critical likelihood ratio Λ is denied by the context. Clas-
sical Statisticians were the first to conclude that there must be some Λ such that you
1Here Ω(A) is the prior odds of the null. Ω(A|D) is the posterior odds given datum D, and L(A; D)
is the likelihood ratio (a.k.a. Bayes factor, BF).
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will guess A if L(A; D) > Λ and guess A¯ if L(A; D) < Λ. By and large, classical
statisticians say the choice of Λ is an entirely subjective one which no one but you
can make (e.g. Lehman, 1959, p.62). Bayesians agree; Λ is inversely proportional to
your current odds for A, an aspect of your personal opinion. The classical statisti-
cians, however, have overlooked a great simplification, namely that your critical Λ
will not depend on the size or structure of the experiment and will be proportional to
J/I. As Savage (1962) puts it: the subjectivist’s position is more objective than the
objectivist’s, for the subjectivist finds the range of coherent or reasonable preference
patterns much narrower than the objectivist thought it to be. How confusing and
dangerous big words are (p.67)!
Given this discussion, we build on the idea that a hypothesis test can be constructed
by focusing on the distribution of the test statistic, denoted by t, under the alternative
hypothesis. Bayes factors can then be calculated once the researcher is willing to assess
a prior predictive interval for the t statistic under the alternative. In most experimental
situations, this appears to be the most realistic way of assessing a priori information. For
related discussion, see Berger and Sellke (1987) and Berger (2003) who pose the ques-
tion of whether Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman could have agreed on testing and provide
illuminating examples illustrating the differences (see Etz and Wagenmakers, 2017).
The rest of our paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides a framework for the
differences between Classical and Bayesian hypothesis testing. Section 3 uses a proba-
bilistic interval assessment for the test statistic distribution under the alternative to as-
sess a Bayes factor. Jeffrey’s (1957, 1961) Cauchy prior and the Bartlett-Lindley paradox
( Lindley, 1957, and Bartlett, 1957) are discussed in this context. Extensions to regression
and R2, χ2 and F tests (see Connely, 1991, and Johnson, 2005, 2008) are also provided.
Section 4 concludes with further discussion and with directions for future research.
2 Bayesian vs Classical Hypothesis Testing
Suppose that you wish to test a sharp null hypothesis H0 : θ = 0 against a non-sharp
composite alternative H1 : θ 6= 0. We leave open the possibility that H0 and H1 could
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represent models and the researcher wishes to perform model selection. A classical test
procedure uses the sampling distribution, denoted by p(θˆ|θ), of a test statistic θˆ, given
the parameter θ. A critical value, c, is used to provide a test procedure of the form
Reject H0 if |θˆ| > c.
There are two types of errors that can arise. Either the hypothesis maybe rejected even
though it is true (a Type I error) or it maybe accepted even though it is false (Type II).
Typically, the critical value c is chosen so as to make the probability of a type I error, α,
to be of fixed size. We write α(c) = 1− ∫ c−c p(θˆ|θ)dθˆ.
Bayes factor, denoted by BF, which is simply a density ratio (as opposed to a tail
probability) is defined by a likelihood ratio
BF =
p(θˆ|H0)
p(θˆ|H1)
.
Here p(θˆ|H0) =
∫
p(θˆ|θ, H0)p(θ|H0)dθ is a marginal distribution of the test statistic and
p(θ|H0) an a priori distribution on the parameter. For a simple hypothesis, (θ|H0) ∼ δθ0
is a Dirac measure at the null value. The difficulty comes in specifying p(θ|H1), the
prior under the alternative. A Bayesian Hypothesis Test can then be constructed in
conjunction with the a priori odds ratio p(H0)/p(H1), to calculate a posterior odds ratio,
via Bayes rule,
p(H0|θˆ)
p(H1|θˆ)
=
p(θˆ|H0)
p(θˆ|H1)
p(H0)
p(H1)
.
As H0 : θ = θ0 and H1 : θ 6= θ0, the Bayes factor calculates p(θˆ|θ = θ0)/p(θˆ|θ 6= θ0).
We will focus on the test statistic distribution under the alternative hypothesis, namely
p(θˆ|θ 6= θ0). See also Held and Ott (2018) for additional discussion on p-values and
Bayes factors.
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3 A Default Bayes Factor
Our approach is best illustrated with the usual t-ratio test statistic in a normal means
problem. As ELS illustrate, the central question that a Bayesian must a priori address is
the question:
How often will t lie in that interval when the null hypothesis is false?
To do this we need an assessment to the distribution of the t-ratio test statistic under the
alternative. As ELS further observe:
This argument, like almost all the following discussion of null hypothesis testing,
hinges on assumptions about the prior distribution under the alternative hypothesis.
The classical statistician usually neglects that distribution in fact, denies its exis-
tence. He considers how unlikely a t as far from 0 as 1.96 is if the null hypothesis is
true, but he does not consider that a t as close to 0 as 1.96 may be even less likely if
the null hypothesis is false.
First, we calculate prior predictive distribution of the test statistic under the alterna-
tive and then show how such assessment can lead to a default Bayes factor.
3.1 Predictive distribution, Pr(T = t|H1)
A simple default approach to quantifying a priori opinion is to assess a hyperparameter,
denoted by A, such that the following probability statements hold true:
Pr
(
−1.96
√
A < T < 1.96
√
A|H1
)
= 0.95
Pr (−1.96 < T < 1.96|H0) = 0.95.
Under the null, H0, both the Bayesian and Classicist agree that A = 1. All that is needed
to complete the specification is the assessment of A.
In the normal mean testing problem we have an iid sample (yi|θ) ∼ N(θ, σ2), for i =
1, . . . , n, with σ2 known and ny¯ = ∑ni=1 yi. Under the null, H0 : θ = 0, the distribution of
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T =
√
ny¯/σ, is the standard normal distribution, namely T ∼ N(0, 1). The distribution
of T under the alternative, H1 : θ 6= 0, is a mixture distribution
p(T = t|H1) =
∫
Θ
p(T = t|θ)p(θ|H1)dθ,
where p(θ|H1) denotes the prior distribution of the parameter under the alternative.
Under a normal sampling scheme, this is a location mixture of normals
p(T = t|H1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
P(T = t|H1, θ)p(θ|H1)dθ
where T|H1, θ is normal with mean
√
nθ/σ and variance one; or T =
√
nθ/σ+ ε, where
ε ∼ N(0, 1).
Under a normal prior, θ ∼ N(0, τ2), the distribution p(T = t|H1) can be calculated
in closed form as T ∼ N(0, A) where A = 1 + nτ2/σ2. Hence an assessment of A will
depend on the design (through n) and the relative ratio of measurement errors (through
τ2/σ2). The gain in simplicity of the Bayes test is off-set by the difficulty in assessing A.
The Bayes factor is then simply the ratio of two normal ordinates
B =
φ(t)
φ(t/
√
A)
=
√
A exp
{
−1
2
t2(1− A−1)
}
.
The factor A is often interpreted as the Occam factor (Berger and Jefferys, 1992, Jefferys
and Berger, 1992, Good, 1992). See Hartigan (2003) for a discussion of default Akaike-
Jeffreys priors and model selection.
Our approach requires the researcher to “calibrate” A ahead of time. One simple
approach is to perform a what if analysis and assess what posterior odds we would
believe if we saw t = 0. This assessment directly gives the quantity
√
A.
Dickey-Savage. The Bayes factor BF for testing H0 versus H1 can be calculated using
the Dickey-Savage density ratio. This relates the posterior model probability p(θ = θ0|y)
to the marginal likelihood ratio via Bayes rule
Pr(θ = θ0|y)
Pr(θ = θ0)
=
p(y|θ = θ0)
p(y)
.
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Bayes Factor Bounds. Let θˆMLE denote the maximum likelihood estimate, then
p(y|H1) =
∫
p(y|θ)p(θ|H1)dθ ≤ p(y|θˆMLE).
This implies that, for H0 : θ = 0,
BF ≥ p(T = t|θ = 0)
p(T = t|θˆ) .
In a normal means testing context, this leads to a bound,
p(y|H0)
p(y|H1) ≥ exp{−0.5(1.96
2 − 02)} = 0.146 .
Under an a priori 1/2-1/2 weight on either side of zero, the bound increases to 0.292.
Hence, at least 30% of the hypotheses that the classical approach rejects are true in the Bayesian
world. Amongst the experiments with p-values of 0.05 at least 30% will actually turn
out to be true! Put another way, the probability of rejecting the null conditional on the
observed p-value of 0.05 is at least 30%. You are throwing away good null hypothesis
and claiming you have found effects! In terms of posterior probabilities, with p(H0) =
p(H1), we have a bound
Pr(H0|y) =
[
1 +
p(y|H1)
p(y|H0)
Pr(H1)
Pr(H0)
]−1
≥ 0.128 .
Hence, there is at least 12.8 percent chance that the null is still true even in the one-sided
version of the problem! Clearly at odds with a p-value of 5 percent.
One of the key issues, as discussed by ELS, is that the classicist approach is based
on an observed p-value is not a probability in any real sense. The observed t-value is a
realization of a statistic that happens to be N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis. Suppose
that we observe t = 1.96. Then the maximal evidence against the null hypothesis which
corresponds to t = 0 will be achieved by evaluating the likelihood ratio at the observed
t ratio, which is distributed N(0, 1).
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3.2 Normal means Bayes factors
We have the following set-up for the normal means case (see Berger and Delampaday,
1989, for the full details): Let y¯|θ ∼ N(θ, σ2/n), where σ2 is known and let t = √n(y¯−
θ0)/σ the t-ratio test statistic when testing the null hypothesis H0 : θ = θ0 against the
alternative hypothesis H0 : θ 6= θ0. Also, let ρ = σ/(
√
nτ) and η = (θ0 − µ)/τ, derived
from a normal prior in the alternative θ ∼ N(µ, τ2). Usually, we take a symmetric prior
and set µ = θ0, such that η = 0 and the Bayes factor simplifies to
BF =
√
1 + ρ−2 exp
(
− 1
2(1 + ρ2)
t2
)
.
We can use the Dickey-Savage density ratio as follows to derive the above Bayes factor:
p(θ0|y¯) = 1√
2piτ
√
1 + ρ−2
exp
(
− 1
2(1 + ρ2)
t2
)
p(θ0) =
1√
2piτ
The posterior distribution under the alternative is
(θ|y) ∼ N
((
n
σ2
+
1
τ2
)−1(ny¯
σ2
+
θ0
τ2
)
,
(
n
σ2
+
1
τ2
)−1)
with quantities
t2 =
n(y¯− θ0)2
σ2
and
(
n
σ2
+
1
τ2
)−1
= τ2(1 + ρ−2)−1.
The posterior mean E(θ|y) can be written as
θ0 +
(
T
σ2
+
1
τ2
)−1 T(y¯− θ0)
σ2
.
Substituting into the ratio of ordinates p(θ = θ0|y)/p(θ = θ0) gives the result.
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In the case where τ is moderate to large, this is approximately
BF =
√
nτ
σ
exp
(
−1
2
t2
)
.
Clearly, the prior variance τ has a dramatic effect on the answer. First, we can see that
the “noninformative” prior τ2 → ∞makes little sense (Lindley, 1957, Bartlett, 1957). For
instance, when σ = τ and t = 2.567 (a p-value of 0.01), then the Bayes factor equals 0.16,
1.15, 3.62 and 36.23 for n equal to 10, 100, 1000 and 1000000, respectively (see Section
3.3 for more details about the Bartlett-Lindley Paradox). Secondly, the large effect is pri-
marily due to the thinness of the normal prior in the tails. Jeffreys (1961) then proposed
the use of a Cauchy (0, σ2) prior (see Section 3.4 for further details).
3.3 Bartlett-Lindley Paradox
See Lindley (1957) and Bartlett (1957) for the full details. The Barlett-Lindley paradox
occurs when you let τ2 → ∞. This has the “appropriate” behaviour at the origin of
flattening out the marginal distribution of T. So when comparing equal length intervals
Pr(a < T < b) and Pr(c < T < d), where a− b = c− d, one would get approximately a
Bayes factor of one.
The so-called paradox arises when the Bayes factor places all its weight on the al-
ternative hypothesis H1. Thought of via the marginal predictive of T this is not sur-
prising. As τ2 → ∞ implies A → ∞, and your belief a priori that you expect an in-
credibly large value of T values under the alternative. Now, when you actually observe
1.96 < T < 2.56 this is unlikely under the null approximately 2%, but nowhere near as
likely under the alternative. The Bayes factor correctly identifies the null as having the
most posterior mass.
3.4 Cauchy Prior
Jeffreys (1961) proposed a Cauchy (centered at θ0 and scale 1) to allow for fat-tails
whilst simultaneously avoiding having to specify a scale to the normal prior. Using
the asymptotic, large n, form of the posterior (
√
n/
√
2piσ) exp{−0.5t2} for the usual
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t-ratio test statistic and the fact that the prior density ordinate from the Cauchy prior is
p(θ0) = 1/(piσ), the Bayes Factor is
BF =
(
√
n/
√
2piσ) exp{−0.5t2}
1/(piσ)
=
√
0.5pin exp{−0.5t2}.
We have the interval probability
Pr(−1.96
√
A < T < −1.96
√
A|H1) ≈ 0.95,
for A ≈ 40, when n = 1 and σ2 = 1. Exact answer given by cdf of hypergeometric Beta
You can also see this in the Bayes factor approximations. Therefore, very different from
letting A→ ∞, in a normal prior.
3.5 Coin tossing: p-values and Bayes
Suppose that you routinely reject two-sided hypotheses at a fixed level of significance,
say α = 0.05. Furthermore, suppose that half the experiments under the null are actu-
ally true, i.e. Pr(H0) = Pr(H1) = 0.5. The experiment will provide data, y, here we
standardize the mean effect and obtain a t-ratio.
Example: Coin Tossing (ELS). Let us start with a coin tossing experiment where you
want to determine whether the coin is “fair”, H0 : Pr(Head) = Pr(Tail), or the coin is
not fair, H1 : Pr(Head) 6= Pr(Tail). ELS discuss at length the following four experiments
where, in each case, the test statistics is t = 1.96. We reproduce below of their Table 1.
Expt 1 2 3 4
n 50 100 400 10,000
r 32 60 220 5,098
BF 0.8 1.1 2.2 11.7
Table 1: The quantities n and r are, respectively, number of tosses of the coin and the
number of heads that barely leads to rejection of the null hypothesis, H0 : Pr(Head) =
Pr(Tail), by a classical two-tailed test at the 5 percent level.
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For n coin tosses and r heads, the Bayes factor,
BF =
(
1
2
)n
/
∫ 1
0
θr(1− θ)n−r p(θ|H1)dθ,
which grows to infinity and so there is overwhelming evidence in favor of H0 : Pr(Head) =
Pr(Tail). This is a clear illustration of Lindley’s paradox.
There are a number of ways of assessing the odds. One is to use a uniform prior.
Another useful approach which gives a lower bound is to use the maximally informative
prior which puts all its mass on the parameter value at the mle, θˆ = r/n. For example,
in the r = 60 versus n = 100 example, we have θˆ = 0.6. Then we have p(y|H1) ≤ p(y|θˆ)
and for the odds ratio
p(y|H0)
p(y|H1) ≥
p(y|θ = θ0)
p(y|θˆ) .
For example, with n = 100 and r = 60, we have
p(y|H0)
p(y|H1) ≥
0.5100
0.6600.440
= 0.134.
In terms of probabilities, if we start with a 50/50 prior on the null, then the posterior
probability of the null is at least 0.118:
Pr(H0|y) =
(
1 +
p(y|H1)
p(y|H0)
Pr(H1)
Pr(H0)
)−1
≥ 0.118.
3.6 Regression
A number of authors have provided extensions to traditional classical tests, for example
Johnson (2008) shows that R2, deviance, t and F can all be interpreted as Bayes factors.
See also Gelman et al (2008) for weakly informative default priors for logistic regression
models.
In the case of nested models, Connelly (1991) proposes the use of
BF = n−
d
2
(
1 +
d
n− k F
) n
2
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where F is the usual F-statistic, k is the number of parameters in the larger model and d
is the difference in dimensionality between the two models. In the non-nested case, first
it helps to nest them if you can, otherwise MCMC comparisons.
Zellner and Siow (1980) extend this to the Cauchy prior case, see Connelly (1991).
Essentially, introduces a constant out-front that depends on the prior ordinate p(θ = θ0).
See Efron and Gous (2001) for additional discussion of model selection in the Fisher and
Jeffreys approaches. Additionally, Polson and Roberts (1994) and Lopes and West (2004)
study model selection in diffusion processes and factor analysis, respectively. Scott and
Berger (2010) compare Bayes and empirical-Bayes in the variable selection context.
4 Discussion
The goal of our paper was to revisit ELS. There are a number of important take-aways
from comparing the Bayesian paradigm to frequentist ones. Jeffreys (1937) provided the
foundation for Bayes factors (see Kass and Raftery, 1995, for a review). Berkson (1938)
was one of the first authors to point out problems with p-values.
The Bayesian viewpoint is clear: you have to condition on what you see. You also
have to make probability assessments about competing hypotheses. The observed y can
be highly unlikely under both scenarios! It is the relative oods that is important. The
p-value under both hypotheses are then very small, but the Bayes posterior probability
is based on the relative odds of observing the data plus the prior, that is p(y|H0) and
p(y|H1) can both be small, but its p(y|H0)/p(y|H1) that counts together with the prior
p(H0)/p(H1). Lindley’s paradox shows that a Bayes test has an extra factor of
√
n which
will asymptotically favor the null and thus lead to asymptotic differences between the
two approaches. There is only a practical problem when 2 < t < 4 – but this is typically
the most interesting case!
Jeffreys (1961), page 385, said that “what the use of P implies . . . is that a hypothesis that
may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not occurred.
This seems a remarkable procedure.”
We conclude with two quotes on what is wrong with classical p-values with some
modern day observations from two Bayesian statisticians.
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Jim Berger: p-values are typically much smaller than actual error probabilities p-values do
not properly seem to reflect the evidience in the data. For instance, suppose one pre-selected
α = 0.001. This then is the error one must report whether p = 0.001 or p = 0.0001, in spite of
the fact that the latter would seem to provide much stronger evidence against the null hypothesis.
Bill Jefferys: The Lindley paradox goes further. It says, assign priors however you wish. You
don’t get to change them. Then take data and take data and take data ... There will be times when
the classical test will reject with probability (1− α) where you choose α very small in advance,
and at the same time the classical test will reject at a significance level α. This will not happen,
regardless of priors, for the Bayesian test. The essence of the Lindley paradox is that “sampling
to a foregone conclusion” happens in the frequentist world, but not in the Bayesian world.
As we pointed out at the outset, hypothesis testing is still a central issue in modern-
day statistics and machine learning, in particular, its relationship with high dimensional
model selection. Finding default regularization procedures in high dimensional settings
is still an attractive area of research.
References
Bartlett, M. S. (1957) Comment on “A Statistical Paradox” by D.V. Lindley. Biometrika,
44, 533-534.
Berger, J. O. (2003) Could Fisher, Jeffreys and Neyman have agreed on testing? Statisti-
cal Science, 18, 1-32.
Berger, J. O. and Delampady, M. (1987) Testing Precise Hypothesis (with Discussion).
Statistical Science, 2, 317-335.
Berger, J. O. and Jefferys, W. H. (1992) The application of robust Bayesian analysis to
hypothesis testing and Occam’s Razor. Journal of the Italian Statistical Society, 1,
17-32.
13
Berger, J. O. and Sellke, T. (1987) Testing of a point null hypothesis: the irreconcilabil-
ity of significance levels and evidence (with Discussion). Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 82, 112-139.
Berkson, J. (1938) Some difficulties of interpretation encountered in the application of
the chi-square test. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 33, 526-542.
Connelly, R. A. (1991) A Posterior Odds Analysis of the Weekend Effect. Journal of
Econometrics, 49, 51-104.
Edwards, W., Lindman, H. and Savage, L. J. (1963) Bayesian Statistical Inference for
Psychological Research. Psychological Review, 70(3), 193-242.
Efron, B. and Gous, A. (2001) Scales of Evidence for Model Selection: Fisher versus
Jeffreys. Model selection, 208-246, Institute of Mathematical Statistics, Beachwood.
Etz, A. and Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2017) J. B. S. Haldane’s Contribution to the Bayes Fac-
tor Hypothesis Test. Statistical Science, 32(2), 313-329.
Gelman, A., Jakulin, A., Pitau, M. G. and Su, Y.-S. (2008) A Weakly Informative Default
Prior Distribution for Logistic and Other Regression Models. The Annals of Applied
Statistics, 2(4), 1360-1383.
Good, I. J. (1992) The Bayes/Non-Bayes Compromise: A Brief Review. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 87, 597-606.
Held, L. and Ott, M. (2018) On p-Values and Bayes Factors. Annual Review of Statistics
and Its Application, 5, 393-419.
Jefferys, W. H. and Berger, J. O. (1992) Ockham’s Razor and Bayesian Analysis. Ameri-
can Scientist, 80, 64-72.
Jeffreys, H. (1957) Scientific inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jeffreys, H. (1961) Theory of Probability. London: Oxford University Press.
14
Johnson, V. (2005) Bayes factors based on test statistics. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, Series B, 67, 689-701.
Johnson, V. (2008) Properties of Bayes Factors Based on Test Statistics. Scandinavian
Journal of Statistics, 35, 354-368.
Kass, R. E. and Raftery, A. E. (1995) Bayes factors. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 90, 773-395.
Lehmann, E. L. (1959) Testing statistical hypotheses, New York: Wiley.
Lindley, D. V. (1957). A Statistical Paradox. Biometrika, 44, 187-192.
Lopes, H. F. and West, M. (2004) Bayesian model assessment in factor analysis. Statistica
Sinica, 14, 41-67.
Polson, N. G. and Roberts, G. O. (1994) Bayes Factors for discrete observations from
diffusion processes. Biometrika, 81(1), 11-26.
Savage, L. J. (1962) Subjective probability and statistical practice. In L. J. Savage et al.,
The foundations of statistical inference: A discussion. New York: Wiley.
Scott, J. G. and Berger, J. O. (2010) Bayes and empirical-Bayes multiplicity adjustment
in the variable-selection problem. Annals of Statistics, 38(5), 2587-2619.
Zellner, A. and Siow, A. (1979) Posterior Odds Ratio for Selected Regression Hypothe-
ses. In: Bayesian Statistics, Proceedings of the First International Meeting (J. M.
Bernardo, M. H. De Groot, D. V. Lindley and A. F. M. Smith, eds), pp. 585-603.
Valencia: University Press.
15
